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ALASKA'S INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE
"GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL" VERDICT
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, a jury found John Hinckley not guilty by reason of in-
sanity ("NGRI") of attempting to assassinate President Ronald Rea-
gan.1 This verdict prompted nationwide attempts to limit insanity
acquittals. In response to the nationwide trend and to a set of brutal
murders committed by an insanity acquittee on leave from a state
mental institution,2 the Alaska legislature rewrote the state's insanity
laws and adopted one of the strictest tests in the United States for
establishing the defense of insanity.3
The test adopted by the Alaska legislature for the insanity defense
drastically narrowed the definition of legal insanity,4 shifted the bur-
den onto the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was insane at the time of the crime,5 and added an alternative
Copyright © 1987 by Alaska Law Review
1. United States v. Hinckley, Crim. No. 81-306 (D.D.C. June 21, 1982). In
Hinckley, the District Court for the District of Columbia applied the Model Penal
Code's test of legal insanity, set out infra at note 4. Hinckley, Crim. No. 81-306. The
court adopted that test in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
After Hinckley's acquittal, commentators criticized the federal test, contending that
its application makes it too easy for a defendant to prove insanity. See P. Low, J.
JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN
THE INSANITY DEFENSE 18-20, 118-22, 126-30 (1986).
2. See Strout, The Alaska Insanity Defense - How Crazy Can You Get?,
ALASKA BAR RAG, Mar. 1986, at 14 n.l. The murderer, who had previously been
found not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGRI"), was on temporary release from the
Alaska Psychiatric Institute when he killed four teenagers.
3. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010-.130 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
4. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (1984) (providing that a defendant is legally in-
sane if at the time of the crime he "was unable, as a result of mental disease or defect,
to appreciate the nature and quality of [his] conduct"). The old law in Alaska was
equivalent to the Model Penal Code "substantial capacity" test. Under this test, a
defendant was legally insane if "as a result of mental disease or defect, he lack[ed]
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law." ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.083(a) (1980) (re-
pealed 1982).
5. Insanity is an "affirmative defense." ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010(a) (1984).
According to ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.130(1) (1984), "affirmative defense" in title 12
has the meaning ascribed to it in ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(1) (1983), which pro-
vides that:
(A) some evidence must be admitted which places in issue the defense; and
(B) the defendant has the burden of establishing the defense by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.
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verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" ("GBMI"). 6 In contrast to a ver-
dict of NGRI, by which the defendant is acquitted, a verdict of GBMI
essentially is a guilty verdict. The GBMI verdict subjects the defend-
ant to the same jail sentence as one found guilty of the offense. The
only difference between the two verdicts is that the state must provide
the GBMI defendant with psychiatric treatment.
The GBMI verdict originated in Michigan in 19757 as a legisla-
tive response to several highly publicized crimes committed by in-
sanity acquittees8 who had been released from state mental hospitals. 9
Eleven other states now use the GBMI verdict.10 Although the GBMI
verdict is controversial, 1I no state has found it unconstitutional and
only one state has repealed the verdict.12
Critics of Alaska's present insanity laws believe that the legisla-
ture overreacted to public misconceptions about abuse of the insanity
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(1) (1983).
Under the old law, insanity was also called an "affirmative defense." ALASKA
STAT. § 12.45.083(b) (1980) (repealed 1982). According to the Alaska Supreme
Court, however, that provision required only that the defendant introduce some evi-
dence of his mental state. Upon such a showing, the prosecution had the burden of
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was sane at the time of the
crime. Alto v. State, 565 P.2d 492, 496 (Alaska 1977).
6. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030 (1984). There was no equivalent to this "guilty
but mentally ill" ("GBMI") provision under the old law.
7. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West 1982).
8. See Brown & Wittner, CriminalLaw, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 335, 356-57 (1979);
Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill. An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 J.
URB. L. 471, 472 (1976).
9. Until 1975, Michigan followed a policy of automatically committing insanity
acquittees without allowing them a hearing to determine their sanity at the time of
commitment. In People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974), the
Michigan Supreme Court held this procedure unconstitutional. According to the
court, the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment re-
quired a hearing to determine the present sanity of a person acquitted under the Mich-
igan scheme before he could be indefinitely committed to a mental hospital under the
state's automatic commitment statute.
10. P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, supra note 1, at 130. Illinois and Indiana
already had GBMI laws at the time of the Hinckley trial. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 115-2(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-3 (Bums 1985).
In 1982, GBMI statutes were adopted by Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, and
New Mexico. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030 (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 408
(Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Supp. 1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 504.120 (Baldwin 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (1984). Since then, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah have adopted GBMI provisions.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 314 (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law. Co-op.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-7-2 (Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
13-1 (Supp. 1986).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 81-85.
12. Connecticut adopted and repealed the law in 1983. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-a-13 (West Supp. 1983) (repealed 1983).
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defense and that the new standard, especially the GBMI alternative, is
confusing, unfair, and possibly unconstitutional. 13 Several arguments
are made challenging the constitutionality of Alaska's insanity laws.
The first of these arguments is that the present narrow definition of
legal insanity unconstitutionally deprives defendants of the insanity
defense. 14 Additionally, opponents charge that the GBMI verdict de-
nies due process, violates equal protection, and constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.1 5 No Alaska court has directly addressed these
arguments, although GBMI defendants have challenged the laws
twice in the Alaska Court of Appeals. 16 The Alaska Supreme Court
has yet to interpret the revised insanity laws.
This note analyzes criticisms of Alaska's insanity laws and con-
cludes that the laws are constitutional and fair to defendants. In addi-
tion, this note suggests ways to administer the GBMI verdict more
efficiently and thereby to quiet some of the criticism. While admitting
that the parameters of the GBMI verdict are undefined, this note as-
serts that the present insanity laws provide an adequate and legitimate
way to narrow the class of defendants acquitted by reason of insanity
and to assure that mentally ill prisoners receive treatment.
II. THE PRESENT LAW
A. The Insanity Defense
Alaska's present insanity laws provide two possible routes to a
NGRI verdict. First, the defendant cannot be held responsible for
acts committed while legally insane. If the trier of fact finds that, at
the time of the crime, the defendant fell within the definition of legal
insanity, it must enter a verdict of NGRI. 17 Second, a defendant must
be found NGRI if, after he presents sufficient evidence of diminished
mental capacity, the state cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt
13. See Strout, supra note 2, at 14.
14. See Note, Guilty But Mentally Ill: Broadening the Scope of Criminal Responsi-
bility, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 797, 811 (1982).
15. Strout charges that Alaska's GBMI verdict "violates basic precepts of consti-
tutional law." Strout, supra note 2, at 14. Other commentators who have attacked
the constitutionality of the GBMI verdict have based their arguments on alleged viola-
tions of the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment and
the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition of the eighth amendment. See, e.g.,
Note, supra note 14, at 811-14; Note, Criminal Responsibility: Changes in the Insanity
Defense and the "Guilty But Mentally 1ll" Response, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 515, 546-50
(1982).
16. Patterson v. State, 708 P.2d 712 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (reversing conviction
because of confusing jury instructions, thereby avoiding the constitutional issues), ap-
peal docketed, No. S-1316 (Alaska Mar. 5, 1986); Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1985) (finding that defendant did not have standing to argue that the statute
violated his constitutional rights).
17. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (1984).
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that the defendant possessed the requisite intent for the crime charged
or for a lesser included offense.18
1. Legal Insanity. A court must acquit a defendant who at the
time of the crime "was unable, as a result of mental disease or defect,
to appreciate the nature and quality of [his criminal] conduct." 19
"Conduct" includes "an act or omission and its accompanying mental
state."'20 Although the Alaska Supreme Court has yet to construe
Alaska's latest definition of legal insanity, the court of appeals has ana-
lyzed the statute's construction on two occassions. In Hart v. State,21
the defendant was convicted of first degree assault and found GBMI
pursuant to an agreement with the state.22 On appeal, Hart chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the insanity defense. 23 Although
neither party expressly requested a construction of the insanity defini-
tion, the Alaska Court of Appeals implied that a "truly broad read-
ing" of the revised statute would be proper. 24
In Patterson v. State,25 which is presently on appeal to the Alaska
Supreme Court, a defendant once again challenged the revised insanity
laws as unconstitutional.26 The Alaska Court of Appeals, following
the language in Hart, broadly interpreted the phrase "to know the na-
ture and quality" of one's conduct. The court stated that the phrase
did not refer to knowing only the physical aspects of an act, for exam-
ple, knowing that one is firing a gun, but rather referred to knowing all
aspects of an act, including the likely consequences to the actor and
others. 27
For evidence of legislative intent, the court of appeals decided not
to use the legislative committee reports.28 Instead, the court accepted
the broad interpretation given to the similar language of the prior defi-
nition of insanity by the Alaska Supreme Court in Chase v. State. 29 In
18. Id. § 12.47.020.
19. Id. § 12.47.010.
20. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(5) (1983). The insanity provisions in title 12
do not contain a definition of "conduct." When the Alaska Court of Appeals inter-
preted Alaska Stat. 12.47.010 (1984), it adopted the definition contained in title 11.
See Hart, 702 P.2d at 655.
21. 702 P.2d 651.
22. Id. at 652.
23. For a discussion of Hart's constitutional arguments, see infra notes 169-70
and accompanying text.
24. Hart, 702 P.2d at 655.
25. 708 P.2d 712 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), appeal docketed, No. S-1316 (Alaska
Mar. 5, 1986).
26. Id. at 712.
27. Id. 716-17.
28. See 1982 ALASKA HOUSE JOURNAL supp. 63, at 5-6 (June 1, 1982).
29. 369 P.2d 997, 999-1002 (Alaska 1962). For a discussion of Chase, see Note,
Criminal Insanity, 8 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 152 (1970).
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Chase, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed a trial court instruction
that a defendant is insane if he is incapable of "knowing the nature
and quality of his act and of distinguishing between right and wrong in
relation to the act."'30 In construing this definition the supreme court
held that knowing the nature and quality of an act meant the "capac-
ity to understand or realize the . . . consequences of conduct, and
whether such conduct is wrong. '31 The Patterson court reasoned that,
when the legislature reenacts statutory language that has already been
judicially construed, the legislature is presumed to have been aware of
the earlier construction and to have intended to use the language in
the same way as the judiciary.32
The Patterson court interpreted the Chase court's definition of the
phrase "to know the nature and quality" of one's conduct as meaning
the ability to foresee the consequences of one's acts and to evaluate
their effects, rather than meaning merely the awareness of physical
acts.33 The court also relied on Chase in construing the meaning of
that phrase to include the defendant's inability to distinguish between
right and wrong conduct.34 Thus, the court of appeals construed the
present statutory definition of insanity as essentially equivalent to the
former broad definition established in Chase. The state has appealed
and has asserted that the court of appeals erred by including the abil-
ity to distinguish between right and wrong in the definition notwith-
standing the legislature's manifest intent to the contrary.35
30. Chase, 369 P.2d at 1002 (quoting trial court) (emphasis that of supreme
court).
31. Id. at 1001-1002.
32. Patterson, 708 P.2d at 716.
33. Id. at 717.
34. Id. at 717 n.3. Note that, as interpreted by the court of appeals in Patterson,
the present test is a modification of the traditional M'Naughten test, whereby
every man is to be presumed to be sane.... [T]o establish a defense on the
ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of the commit-
ting of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong.
M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). The Alaska insanity defense does
not include the "irresistible impulse" test, which has been added by many jurisdictions
that use the M'Naughten test. Under this addition, a defendant is deemed insane if he
is unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-3 (1984).
35. Brief for Petitioner at 1, State v. Patterson, No. S-1316 (Alaska docketed Mar.
5, 1986). The state relies on the committee report which states:
this legislation enacts one branch of the M'Naughten test of insanity. That
portion of the M'Naughten test which defines legal insanity as including situ-
ations where the defendant did not know the wrongfulness of his conduct is
specifically rejected by this legislation and excluded from the revised defini-
tion of legal insanity.
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Another significant change in Alaska's insanity defense is the re-
quirement that the defendant prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that he was insane at the time of the crime.36 Under the former
law, the state had the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt.37 This shift in the burden of proof is constitutionally sound. In
Leland v. Oregon,38 the United States Supreme Court held that a state
could require a defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt
as long as the statute did not diminish the state's burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt both the mens rea and the actus reus of the
crime.39 Alaska's law, which requires the state to bear both these bur-
dens, 4° satisfies the Leland test.
2. Diminished Capacity with Lack of Mens Rea. The second in-
sanity defense available under present Alaska law arises when the state
cannot prove mens rea for the offense charged or for a lesser included
offense.4 1 If the defendant's evidence of diminished mental capacity
prevents the state from proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant possessed the requisite intent for the crime charged, the
trier of fact must determine if the evidence supports conviction for a
lesser included offense.42 If the trier of fact does not find the defend-
ant guilty of a lesser included offense, the defendant must be found
NGRI.43
1982 ALASKA HOUSE JOURNAL supp. 63, at 6 (June 1, 1982).
36. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030(1) (1984); see supra note 5.
37. See supra note 5.
38. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
39. Id. at 799, cited in Hart, 702 P.2d at 656.
40. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600 (1983) (providing that the minimal require-
ments for criminal liability include a "voluntary act or... omission" done with "a
culpable mental state").
41. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.020 (1984).
42. Id. § 12.47.020(c). If the defendant is convicted of a lesser included offense,
he will automatically be considered GBMI. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
A lesser included offense is one "necessarily included in the offense charged."
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 31(c). According to one definition, an offense is "necessarily
included" if it is impossible to commit the greater offense without having committed
the lesser, "necessarily included" offense. Another approach requires that the facts
charged in the indictment must have provided the defendant actual notice of possible
lesser included offenses. The Alaska Supreme Court has acknowledged both defini-
tions but has failed to choose between them. See Elisovsky v. State, 592 P.2d 1221,
1225-26 (Alaska 1979). For a detailed analysis of lesser included offenses in Alaska,
see Note, Lesser Included Offenses in Alaska: State v. Minano, 3 ALASKA L. REV. 199
(1986).
43. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.020 (1984). This section provides:
When the trier of fact finds that all other elements of the crime have been
proved but, as a result of mental disease or defect, there is a reasonable
doubt as to the existence of a culpable mental state that is an element of the
crime, it shall enter a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
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B. The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict
The most controversial change in Alaska's insanity laws was the
adoption of the GBMI verdict. 4 A GBMI defendant in Alaska is sub-
ject to the same jail sentence as a mentally competent defendant found
guilty of the same offense. 45 The Department of Corrections, however,
must prescribe and provide treatment to the GBMI defendant until he
no longer suffers from mental illness. 46 When treatment ends, the
GBMI defendant must serve the remainder of his sentence.4 7 A de-
fendant undergoing treatment is ineligible for furlough or parole.48
There are several ways in which a factfinder may reach a verdict
of GBMI. The trier of fact may find GBMI any defendant who raises
the affirmative defense of insanity.49 Even if the defendant does not
raise the insanity defense at trial, the court may find him GBMI in a
postconviction hearing. In order to institute a postconviction hearing,
the defendant, the prosecuting attorney, or the court must question
the mental health of the defendant.50 Finally, if the state does not
prove mens rea for the offense charged, but the defendant is convicted
of a lesser included offense, the defendant will automatically be consid-
ered GBMI of the lesser included offense.51
III. CRITICISM OF ALASKA'S INSANITY LAWS
A. The Insanity Defense
The significance of the GBMI verdict in a particular jurisdiction
is directly related to the definition of "legal insanity" adopted by that
Id.
This mens rea defense may be the only constitutionally required component of an
insanity defense. See infra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
44. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030 (1984) provides:
A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if, when the defendant engaged in the
criminal conduct, the defendant lacked, as a result of mental disease or de-
fect, the substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of that
conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law. A defendant
found guilty but mentally ill is not relieved of criminal responsibility for
criminal conduct.
Id.
45. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.050(a) (Supp. 1986).
46. Id. § 12.47.050(b).
47. Id. § 12.47.050(c).
48. Id. § 12.47.050(d).
49. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.040 (1984).
50. Id. § 12.47.060(a).
51. Id. § 12.47.020(b),(c). Under section 12.47.020(b), the defendant is NGRI if
the state fails to prove the mens rea necessary for conviction of the offense charged.
Section 12.47.020(c) provides, in turn: "If a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
is reached under (b) of this section, the trier of fact shall also consider whether the
defendant is guilty of any lesser included offense."
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jurisdiction. A state that broadly defines insanity will have a corre-
spondingly small category of defendants who will be found GBMI.
Conversely, in a state where legal insanity is very difficult to prove, a
mentally ill person is more likely to be found GBMI.5 2 Opponents of
Alaska's present laws criticize the state legislature for placing Alaska
in the second category. Because the legislature narrowed the insanity
defense almost to the point of nonexistence,5 3 opponents argue, many
people who could have proved insanity under the old law are no
longer eligible for acquittal by reason of insanity and are subject to a
GBMI verdict.5 4 This argument, which implies that Alaska has effec-
tively eliminated the NGRI verdict and is incarcerating people who
deserve an acquittal by reason of insanity, is unfounded for two rea-
sons. First, the new definition of insanity has not effectively elimi-
nated the NGRI defense. The Alaska Court of Appeals has
interpreted the current definition of legal insanity broadly.55 Second,
mentally ill defendants who are being incarcerated under the GBMI
verdict do not have as broad a right to the insanity defense as this
criticism implies. Much discretion resides with the states on how to
define legal insanity. Alaska has not abused that discretion or violated
any federal or state constitutional provisions. 56
The committee reports indicate that the Alaska legislature in-
tended the present insanity standard to be narrow.5 7 Those reports
52. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.21a(l) (West 1982) (broad defini-
tion, applying in situations in which, as a result of mental illness or mental retarda-
tion, defendant lacked "substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of
the conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law") with S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 22-1-2(18A) (Supp. 1986) (narrow definition, applying where, at
the time of the act charged, the defendant was "incapable of knowing its
wrongfulness").
53. See Note, supra note 14, at 811. One commentator argues that:
Alaska ... has made the most radical change.... In effect, the law requires
conviction of all but those who suffer from the most extreme forms of mental
illness.... This approach is particularly subject to constitutional attack. It
narrows legal insanity almost to the point of nonexistence and may unconsti-
tutionally deprive defendants of the insanity defense.
Id.
54. In fact, the previous definition of insanity in Alaska, the Model Penal Code's
"substantial capacity" test, is the standard now used for determining whether a de-
fendant is GBMI. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.083(a) (1980) (repealed 1982), quoted
supra at note 4. This switch was the basis for an equal protection argument discussed
infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
57. See 1982 ALASKA HOUSE JOURNAL supp. 63, at 5-6 (June 1, 1982).
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suggest that the phrase to know "the nature and quality of [one's] con-
duct ' 58 refers only to the defendant's knowledge of the physical as-
pects of his actions - for example, whether he knew he was firing a
gun. Despite the apparent legislative intent, the Alaska Court of Ap-
peals relied on an Alaska Supreme Court opinion written before the
revisions to the insanity laws to construe the phrase as referring to the
defendant's knowledge of all aspects of an act, including the likely
consequences to the actor and others.59 The court of appeals also im-
plied that a defendant who lacked the capacity to know whether his
act was right or wrong would be deemed insane.60 Apparently, the
Alaska Court of Appeals viewed the present definition of insanity as
equivalent to a liberal reading of the M'Naughten test.61 Pending the
Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Patterson, the broad interpreta-
tion by the Alaska Court of Appeals stands.
An interpretation of the insanity definition that is as narrow as
the legislature apparently intended would be constitutional. The
United States Supreme Court seems reluctant to recognize a constitu-
tional right to any specific insanity defense.62 In fact, three states,
Idaho, Montana, and Utah have actually abolished a separate insanity
defense and now allow evidence of mental illness to be introduced only
to negate the element of mens rea.63 Although the constitutionality of
an insanity defense of the type used in Idaho, Montana, and Utah has
never been decided by the United States Supreme Court, in State v.
Korell, the Montana Supreme Court held that the Montana statute
met the minimum constitutional requirements for an insanity
defense.64
58. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010(a) (1984).
59. Patterson v. State, 708 P.2d 712, 717 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); see supra notes
25-35 and accompanying text.
60. Patterson, 708 P.2d at 716. The court relied on Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997
(Alaska 1962), for the proposition that the ability to distinguish between right and
wrong is included in the idea of knowing the nature and quality of one's conduct. See
supra note 34.
61. Patterson, 708 P.2d at 717; see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
62. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968) ("Nothing could be less fruitful
than for this Court to be impelled into defining some sort of insanity test in constitu-
tional terms.").
63. IDAHO CODE § 18.207 (Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (1985);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1986). See also The Insanity Defense: Hearings
on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558, S. 2669, S. 2672, S. 2678, S. 2745, and S. 2780 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (proposal to add the
GBMI verdict and abolish the insanity defense in favor of the mens rea approach
under federal law).
64. State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984); see also Note, State v. Korell:
Montana Sees No Insanity in the Constitution, 21 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 944 (1985).
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The defendant in Korell argued that abolition of a separate in-
sanity defense violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the
eighth amendment. 65 Relying on Leland v. Oregon 66 and In re Win-
ship, 67 the Montana court upheld the constitutionality of the statute.68
In Leland, the United States Supreme Court held that the due process
clause does not require any particular insanity defense or allocation of
burden of proof.69 In Winship, the Court ruled that in order to satisfy
the due process clause, a state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every element of the offense charged.70 The Montana Supreme Court
concluded that the logical extension of the United States Supreme
Court's holdings in Leland and Winship was that a state may abolish a
separate insanity defense without violating the due process clause, as
long as the state allows the defendant to produce evidence of his
mental state in order to establish a reasonable doubt about the exist-
ence of mens rea.71
The defendant in Korell also argued that the state's lack of a sepa-
rate insanity defense constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 72 The
defendant relied on Robinson v. California,73 in which the United
States Supreme Court held that classifying drug addiction as a crime
punished a defendant's status, rather than any act, and thus violated
the eighth amendment.74 The Robinson Court also noted in dicta that
any law that made mental illness a criminal offense would probably
also be considered cruel and unusual punishment.75 While acknowl-
edging the wisdom of Robinson, the Korell court reasoned that punish-
ing a defendant for a criminal act committed while he is mentally ill is
not the equivalent of punishing him for being mentally ill. The Korell
court found the case similar to Powell v. Texas, 76 where the United
States Supreme Court found that a statute prohibiting public intoxica-
tion punished the act of public drunkenness, not the status of being an
65. Korell, 690 P.2d at 998.
66. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
67. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
68. Korell, 690 P.2d at 1002.
69. Leland, 343 U.S. at 798-801; see also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536
(1968).
70. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
71. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 1000.
72. Id. at 1001.
73. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
74. Id. at 667.
75. Id. at 666.
76. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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alcoholic, and thus did not violate the eighth amendment. 77 The Kor-
ell court concluded that the Montana statute punished criminal acts,
not the state of mental illness.78
The above discussion shows that little foundation exists for the
argument that by narrowly defining legal insanity a state unconstitu-
tionally deprives defendants of the insanity defense. The only consti-
tutional requirement for the insanity defense is that the state must
prove mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt.79 Because Alaska requires
the factfinder to render a NGRI verdict if the defendant presents evi-
dence of diminished mental capacity and the state fails to prove mens
rea,80 Alaska assures defendants of their constitutional right to an in-
sanity defense.
B. The GBMI Verdict
Opponents of GBMI legislation throughout the country have crit-
icized the verdict as being unfair to defendants. Critics claim that
GBMI causes juror compromises,81 discourages defendants from rais-
ing the insanity defense,82 fails to guarantee the prisoner anything to
which he is not already entitled,83 and does not result in the actual
treatment of the GBMI prisoner.84 Opponents have also argued that
the verdict violates the due process and equal protection clauses and
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.8 5
1. GBMI Does Not Cause Juror Compromise. Critics of GBMI
claim that the verdict confuses juries and that such confusion often
results in jury compromise and disregard for the NGRI verdict.86
Some critics fear that juries are unable to draw a distinction between
"mental illness" and "insanity. ' 87 Others believe that conflict between
the desire to provide treatment and the desire to ensure that violent
individuals will be incarcerated may lead juries to elect a verdict of
77. Id. at 532.
78. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 1001.
79. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
80. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.020 (1984), quoted supra at note 43.
81. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 114-18.
86. See, e.g., Note, supra note 15, at 550-51.
87. See Fentiman, Guilty But Mentally 1ll: The Real Verdict is Guilty, 26 B.C.L.
REV. 601, 639 (1985); Comment, The Constitutionality of Michigan's Guilty But Men-




GBMI when the evidence more reasonably supports a finding of legal
insanity.88
The difficulty in ascertaining the basis for a jury's verdict makes a
direct response to these arguments impossible. If these concerns are
well founded, it would seem that there should have been a substantial
decline in the number of successful insanity defenses in Alaska since
the adoption of the GBMI verdict. Unfortunately, any measurement
of the impact of the GBMI verdict on the use of the insanity defense in
Alaska is difficult. Only five or six insanity acquittals occurred annu-
ally before 1982 under the previous insanity defense.89 The infre-
quency with which insanity acquittals were returned prior to 1982
would make it difficult to establish that a change in the number of
insanity acquittals resulted from anything more than chance.
Despite the inherent difficulties in assessing the impact of the
GBMI verdict, an empirical study conducted by the state of Michigan
seven years after the state's adoption of the GBMI verdict produced
useful information. The Michigan study is especially helpful in isolat-
ing the effects of the availability of the GBMI verdict on jury decisions
because Michigan did not change the definition of insanity when it
adopted the GBMI verdict. 90 The results of the Michigan study indi-
cated that little change in the successful use of the insanity defense
occurred after the adoption of the GBMI verdict. This suggests that
juries will not use the GBMI verdict to convict defendants who other-
wise would have been found NGRI.91 A survey of prosecutors in sev-
eral states that adopted the GBMI verdict led to a similar conclusion.
The majority of these officials believed that most GBMI defendants in
their states would have been found guilty, rather than NGRI, in the
absence of a GBMI alternative.92
88. See Comment, supra note 8, at 492; Comment supra note 87, at 196-98; Note,
supra note 15, at 550.
89. Comment, supra note 8, at 508.
90. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.21a (West 1982).
91. Special Project, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty But Mentally 1l Verdict: An
Empirical Study, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 77 (1982). The special project's authors
compared a group of GBMI convicts with a group of NGRI acquittees to assess po-
tential affinities among them. They concluded that "at least a majority of the GBMI
defendants would have been found guilty in the absence of the GBMI statute." Id. at
100.
92. Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should
Not Have Come, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 494, 510 n.73 (citing NATIONAL CENTER
FOR STATE COURTS, THE "GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL" PLEA AND VERDICT: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY: FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 2-3 (working draft Nov. 15,
1984)). According to the National Center for State Courts, 78% of the 74 state prose-
cutors polled believed that most offenders would have been found guilty, as opposed to
NGRI, if the GBMI alternative had not been available. Id.
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The purpose of the GBMI verdict is not to reduce insanity acquit-
tals by encouraging juries to convict the insane, but rather to achieve
greater social control over dangerous, mentally ill prisoners who none-
theless would have been convicted. 93 Implementation of procedural
safeguards designed to ensure that these prisoners receive treatment
while in jail and, if necessary after release,94 should decrease the likeli-
hood of repeated criminal manifestation of their mental illness.
In rebuttal to the argument that the GBMI alternative confuses
juries, one proponent of the GBMI verdict claims that the verdict ac-
tually clarifies a juror's reasoning by forcing him to consider carefully
the causal nexus between the mental illness and the offense.95 For ex-
ample, if a person suffers from a delusion that his spouse is a devil, he
might plead insanity for the crime of attacking his wife. If, however,
he has no mental illness other than that delusion, he is not excused for
attacking a stranger because no causal relation between the illness and
the offense then exists. 96 Jurors should realize, therefore, that finding
some manifestation of mental illness does not necessarily compel the
conclusion that the defendant was legally insane with respect to the
crime.97
2. GBMI Does Not Discourage Use of the Insanity Defense. One
critic fears that because a GBMI convict in Alaska is ineligible for
parole or furlough, 98 a defendant may decide not to raise the issue of
his mental state to avoid the possibility of a GBMI verdict.99 The fact
that a defendant in Alaska may be subject to a GBMI verdict even if
he does not raise the insanity defense should alleviate concern over
this possibility. A posttrial motion by the prosecutor or the court may
result in the rendering of a GBMI verdict.100 If a seriously mentally ill
defendant chooses to forgo use of the insanity defense at trial, either
the court or the prosecutor is likely to move for a posttrial GBMI
hearing.
A defendant should not forgo raising the insanity defense simply
because a GBMI verdict will preclude parole or furlough. The ban on
parole and furlough continues only so long as the GBMI defendant
93. See Note, Guilty But Mentally ill: A Critical Analysis, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 453,
464-65 (1983) (concluding, however, that the potential benefits of the GBMI verdict
are not sufficient to call for its adoption).
94. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.050(e) (1984).
95. See Slovenko, Commentaries on Psychiatry and Law: "Guilty But Mentally
Il," 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 541, 542-43 (Winter 1982).
96. Id. at 543.
97. Id.
98. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.050(d) (Supp. 1986).
99. See Strout, supra note 2.
100. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.060 (1984).
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requires treatment. 101 Because a prisoner's mental condition is a rele-
vant factor in a parole 0 2 or furlough10 3 decision, a GBMI prisoner is
in no worse a position than a mentally ill prisoner who received an
ordinary guilty verdict. Neither prisoner will be released while he is
still dangerous. Moreover, without guaranteed treatment, the mental
condition of the non-GBMI prisoner is likely to remain unchanged, 104
while the treated GBMI prisoner may improve and become eligible for
an earlier release.
3. The GBMI Verdict Serves a Distinctive Purpose. Another criti-
cism of the GBMI verdict is that it offers the GBMI convict no greater
access to treatment than that guaranteed in the absence of the GBMI
statute. 105 The Alaska Supreme Court has held that a prisoner in the
custody of the Department of Corrections has the right to receive psy-
chiatric treatment. 0 6 Alaska law provides, furthermore, that "noth-
ing in [the GBMI provisions] limits the discretion of the court to
recommend, or of the Department of Corrections to provide, psychiat-
rically indicated treatment for a defendant who is not adjudged guilty
but mentally ill. '"107
A GBMI verdict thus appears to be meaningless in the sense that
a prisoner technically enjoys the same right to treatment regardless of
whether a GBMI verdict is returned. Theoretically, however, a
GBMI prisoner is guaranteed treatment pursuant to a presumption of
need, 0 8 while an ordinary prisoner has the right to treatment only
101. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.050(d) (Supp. 1986) "provides that a defendant receiv-
ing treatment is not eligible for parole or furlough. Alaska Stat. § 12.47.050(b) (Supp.
1986) provides that a prisoner must receive treatment "until [he] no longer suffers
from a mental disease or defect that causes [him] to be dangerous to the public peace
or safety." Id. These subsections strongly imply that once a prisoner's treatment is
successfully completed and he ceases to pose a danger to society, he will regain his
eligibility for parole and furlough.
102. ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.100(a)(3) (1986) (the granting of parole is at the dis-
cretion of the parole board, which must consider, among other factors, whether the
prisoner will pose a threat of harm to the public).
103. Id. § 33.30.091(1), (10) (the granting of furloughs is at the discretion of the
Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, who must consider safeguards to the
public and any other factors he deems appropriate).
104. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
105. See Note, supra note 93, at 463. ("In summary, the new verdict adds little to
the guarantee of treatment that is presently available outside the guilt adjudication
process."); see also NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, MYTHS AND REALITIES: A
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE, at 32-33
(1983).
106. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134, 143 & n.34 (Alaska 1978).
107. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.055 (1984).
108. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.050(b) (Supp. 1986) ("The Department of Corrections
shall provide mental health treatment to a defendant found guilty but mentally
ill."(emphasis added)).
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upon request or by direction of the Department of Corrections. Be-
cause a mentally ill prisoner might not believe he needs help or might
be discouraged by his peers from requesting aid, the GBMI verdict
assures that a mentally ill offender actually receives the treatment to
which he is legally entitled.
Another distinctive feature of the GBMI verdict is that it is far
less stigmatizing than the ordinary guilty verdict. By rendering a
GMBI verdict, the trier of fact acknowledges that, although culpable,
the GBMI offender may not be culpable to the same degree as an of-
fender who committed the crime with a sound mind. Perhaps the idea
that a GBMI verdict is less stigmatizing derives from the observation
that the verdict generally results from a jury determination that the
GBMI defendant differs from the ordinary guilty defendant, rather
than from a postconviction medical diagnosis prescribing psychiatric
care. Because a GBMI conviction does not result in a lesser sentence
and psychiatric treatment is available to all prisoners upon reasonable
request, the fact that defendants frequently plea bargain for a GBMI
verdict suggests that they perceive the GBMI verdict as preferable to a
guilty verdict. 109
4. Abolishing the GBMI Verdict Is Not the Solution for Inadequate
Treatment. Critics of the GBMI verdict assert that the verdict lulls
the jury into believing that the defendant will receive all necessary
treatment during his period of incarceration. Unfortunately, GBMI
defendants frequently do not receive the treatment to which they are
statutorily entitled. 110 Particularly in Alaska, where mental health
treatment generally remains scarce and of poor quality, the charge
that GBMI inmates receive inadequate treatment appears merit-
orious.I 11
109. See NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, supra note 105, at 33. Attorney
William Meyer, Director of the Center for Forensic Psychiatry of Michigan, told the
Commission that most GBMI convicts in Michigan plea bargained for the GBMI
conviction. According to Meyer, these persons are mostly sex offenders with strong
cases against them and very little chance of being found NGRI. Meyer stated that:
It appears to us that what they're doing is they are pleading "guilty but
mentally ill" in an attempt to somehow soften the effect on their friends and
family and even themselves of their criminal behavior, that somehow,
although it doesn't excuse them from their criminal behavior because they
still have to go to prison and so on, in their minds it might excuse them.
Id.
110. A Michigan study showed that 75% of those found GBMI in that state re-
ceive no treatment. The Insanity Plea on Trial, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 1982, at 56-60.
111. See Strout, supra note 2, at 14. One commentator explains:
Another major issue for the practitioner ... is the dearth of treatment pro-
grams available in Alaska. Clients who have been to [the Alaska Psychiatric
Institute] would rather be in jail; community-based programs are nearly
non-existent. Private institutions are prohibitively expensive. Our jails are
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While the accessibility and scope of the treatment available to
GBMI inmates are legitimate concerns, the problem of inadequate
treatment does not affect the validity of the GBMI statute. As both
Michigan and Indiana courts have recognized, a declaration of uncon-
stitutionality is not the proper remedy for the denial of treatment
guaranteed under the GBMI statute. The grant of a writ of manda-
mus against the Department of Corrections112 or relief under civil
rights laws1 13 is sufficient to remedy the unlawful denial of the GBMI
prisoner's right to treatment. Similarly, if Alaska lacks the resources
to treat GBMI prisoners, the solution lies not in abolishing the GBMI
verdict, but in reforming Alaska's mental health system.
5. The GBMI Verdict Is Constitutional. The main arguments
against the GBMI verdict, most of which were raised and circum-
vented in Hart 114 and Patterson,115 are that the verdict infringes upon
defendants' constitutional rights by denying them due process,11 6 im-
posing cruel and unusual punishment," 7 and violating the equal pro-
tection clauses of the United States and Alaska Constitutions.' 8
a. Due process. The due process argument is that a defendant ad-
judged GBMI is denied procedural due process because, at any time
during the period of incarceration, the state may subject him to invol-
untary psychiatric treatment without a hearing to determine his pres-
ent mental state. 119 The test for determining whether procedural due
process has been denied is twofold. First, the asserted interest is only
protected if it falls within one of the fourteenth amendment categories
of protected interests-"life, liberty, or property."' 120 Second, if the
interest falls within fourteenth amendment protection, the state must
employ adequate procedural safeguards in any action that might result
in the impairment of that interest. 121 In Mathews v. Eldridge, 122 the
currently full of people who should more appropriately be treated in
hospitals.
Id.
112. See, e.g., Stader v. State, 453 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); People
v. Toner, 125 Mich. App. 439, 441, 336 N.W.2d 22, 23 (1983); People v. Willsie, 96
Mich. App. 350, 355, 292 N.W.2d 145, 147 (1980).
113. See Stader, 453 N.E.2d at 1036 (stating that the proper mechanism for them
to use in challenging the conditions of their custody is a federal civil rights action).
114. 702 P.2d 651 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
115. 708 P.2d 712 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
116. See Note, supra note 15, at 548.
117. See Note, supra note 14, at 814.
118. See Hart, 702 P.2d at 653; Comment, supra note 8, at 490.
119. See Note, supra note 15, at 548 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)).
120. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
121. Id. at 333.
122. 424 U.S. 319.
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Supreme Court promulgated a balancing test for determining whether
procedures are fair within the context of due process. The strength of
the individual interest and the risk of error in the state action are
weighed against the strength of the state's interest and the burden on
the state of providing additional safeguards. 123
Although a prisoner's liberty is greatly impaired by incarceration,
he retains certain liberty interests that the state may not freely disre-
gard. In Vitek v. Jones, 124 the Supreme Court held that the involun-
tary transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital for psychiatric
treatment involves protected liberty interests distinguishable from
mere freedom from confinement. 125 Specifically, the prisoner is faced
with the stigma of being found mentally ill and the threat of forced
behavior modification. 126 The interests implicated by the involuntary
transfer of a GBMI inmate are protected under the fourteenth amend-
ment. The state, therefore, must show that the necessary procedural
safeguards accompany the decision to transfer an inmate.
In Vitek, the Court found that the involuntary transfer of an ordi-
nary prisoner for psychiatric treatment without a hearing to determine
his present mental state failed the balancing test for procedural fair-
ness.127 Proponents of the due process argument assert that the invol-
untary transfer of a GBMI inmate for psychiatric treatment without a
hearing on his present mental state constitutes a situation analogous to
that in Vitek 128 The persuasive factor in Vitek however, was the high
probability of the state's erroneously treating a mentally competent
prisoner because that prisoner had never had a hearing to determine
his mental state. 129 Another consideration underlying the ruling in
Vitek was that the prisoner received notice of the transfer too late to
challenge the move effectively. 130
A GBMI prisoner is not in the same position as an ordinary in-
mate who is transferred to a mental hospital. The GBMI prisoner has
already had the benefit of a proper judicial hearing to determine his
mental capacity at the time of the crime. The possibility of errone-
ously subjecting a GBMI prisoner to unnecessary treatment, therefore,
is unlikely. The GBMI prisoner also has received sufficient notice of
the state's intention to treat his mental illness. Finally, the strength of
the GBMI prisoner's interest in avoiding the stigma of mental illness is
not comparable to that of the ordinary prisoner. Any stigma probably
123. Id. at 335.
124. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
125. Id. at 494.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 494-95.
128. See Note, supra note 15, at 548.
129. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 495.
130. Id. at 496.
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attached to the GBMI prisoner with the pronouncement of the
verdict.
When the Mathews analysis is applied to the involuntary transfer
of a GBMI prisoner, it becomes clear that saving the state the cost of
one more hearing for the GBMI inmate, along with the state's interest
in treating mentally ill criminals, outweighs the probability of errone-
ously treating a GBMI inmate. These state interests also outweigh the
inmate's interest in participating in a second hearing on his mental
state prior to a transfer to a psychiatric hospital. The GBMI verdict,
therefore, contains adequate safeguards and passes the test for proce-
dural fairness under the due process clause.
b. Cruel and unusual punishment. Two arguments can be made
in support of the proposition that the GBMI verdict constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. The first argument is that the verdict may
subject a competent prisoner to forced psychiatric treatment. The sec-
ond argument runs as follows: GBMI inmates may receive inadequate
treatment compared to those committed to mental hospitals. 131
In Rummel v. Estelle, 132 the United States Supreme Court reaf-
firmed that the test to determine whether a punishment is "cruel and
unusual" under the eighth amendment is to decide whether the pun-
ishment is in proportion to the crime. 133 If the crime and the punish-
ment lack proportionality, the sentence may violate the eighth
amendment. The Supreme Court also expressed in Rummel an un-
willingness to find statutorily prescribed punishments, other than capi-
tal punishment, cruel and unusual.134 The Court stated that
"[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to
the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly
rare."1 35
Whether treatment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment de-
pends on the particular facts of each case. 136 If a competent prisoner
receives unnecessary treatment, he can argue that his treatment is
cruel and unusual punishment. Such an argument, however, does not
render the entire GBMI statute vulnerable to attack on eighth amend-
ment grounds. 137 Similarly, while a prisoner may be able to show that
131. See Note, supra note 14, at 814.
132. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
133. Id. at 271.
134. Id. at 272. The Rummel Court held that life imprisonment was not a dispro-
portionate punishment for a defendant convicted under a statute requiring a life sen-
tence upon a third felony, even though the particular defendant had been convicted of
three minor felonies.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 268.
137. Cf id.
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he is being treated less adequately in jail than his civilly committed
counterpart in a mental hospital, 138 such a showing does not justify
invalidating the entire statute. The legislature contemplated that all
prisoners would be treated adequately. 139 If the Department of Cor-
rections fails to meet its statutory obligations, the proper remedy
would be to apply for a writ of mandamus against the Department to
compel adequate treatment. 4°
c. Equal protection. Another argument made against the GBMI
verdict is that the verdict violates the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution by treating GBMI defendants differently
from other defendants on the basis of mental illness. 14 1 The equal pro-
tection clause requires that similarly situated individuals be treated
similarly.142 The level of review of state action depends on the criteria
used by the state in categorizing people or on the interest implicated
by the classification. If the classification is based on a "suspect cate-
gory"1 43 or implicates a "fundamental right," 144 the federal test is one
of strict scrutiny - the classification must be necessary to promote a
compelling government interest. 145 Otherwise, the federal test de-
mands a rational relationship between the classification and some le-
gitimate state objective.146
The Supreme Court has never held that mental illness constitutes
a suspect category, and arguably will never do so. Thus, GBMI legis-
lation will not be examined under the "compelling government inter-
est" standard. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 147 the
138. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that deliberate indif-
ference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the eighth amendment).
139. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.050(b) (Supp. 1986).
140. See People v. Sorna, 88 Mich. App. 351, 362, 276 N.W.2d 892, 897 (1979).
141. Courts that have addressed this argument on the merits have rejected it. See,
e.g., Taylor v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. 1982); People v. Rone, 109 Mich. App.
702, 311 N.W.2d 835 (1981); People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909
(1980).
142. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
143. Suspect categories are generally those "saddled with such disabilities, or sub-
jected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a posi-
tion of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
144. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 n.3 (1976)
(giving as examples of fundamental rights those of a uniquely private nature, such as
the right to vote, the right of interstate travel, rights guaranteed by the first amend-
ment, and the right to procreate).
145. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
146. Id.
147. 473 U.S. 432.
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Court refused to regard mental retardation as a suspect category in
part because it sought to avoid the general extension of suspect cate-
gory status to mental illness. 148 The Supreme Court also has treated
as "fundamental" rights only those rights explicitly or implicitly guar-
anteed by the Constitution, for example, voting, access to courts, and
travel.149 The classification of the GBMI defendant as one who re-
quires special treatment, therefore, does not implicate a fundamental
right under the federal Constitution. Thus, if challenged under the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, this classifi-
cation will be examined under the rational relationship standard.
Although neither Hart 150 nor Patterson 151 acknowledged the pos-
sibility of an equal protection analysis claim under the Alaska Consti-
tution, 152 it deserves mention that equal protection analysis under the
Alaska Constitution differs from that under the federal Constitu-
tion. 153 The Alaska Supreme Court has frequently criticized the rigid,
two-tiered federal test, which purports to apply strict scrutiny in cases
involving suspect categories or fundamental rights and a rational rela-
tionship test in all other cases. 154 For equal protection challenges aris-
ing under the Alaska Constitution, Alaska has adopted a more
flexible, "sliding-scale" test that creates a continuum of levels of scru-
tiny, which vary with the interests involved. 155
In Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 156 the Alaska Supreme
Court refined Alaska's approach to equal protection challenges by ar-
ticulating a three-part framework. 157 First, the court must determine
what weight is to be given to the interest impaired by the challenged
148. Id. at 442-47. The Cleburne Court noted that the mentally retarded are sub-
stantially similar to "other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting
them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative re-
sponses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at
large." The Court feared that classification of the mentally retarded as a suspect, or
"quasi-suspect," category would lead to the extension of this constitutional distinc-
tion, not only to the mentally ill, but to the aged, the disabled, and the infirm. Id. at
445.
149. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 788 (11th ed. 1985).
150. 702 P.2d 651 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
151. 708 P.2d 712 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
152. Alaska's equal protection guarantee is found in ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1:
"[A]II persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection
under the law. . . ." Id.
153. For a detailed study of equal protection under the Alaska Constitution, see
Wise, Northern Lights - Equal Protection Analysis in Alaska, 3 ALASKA L. REv. 1
(1986).
154. See, e.g., State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978).
155. See Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269 (1984) (citing
Erickson, 574 P.2d 1).
156. 687 P.2d 264.
157. Id. at 269.
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law, and then, in light of the weight of that interest, must specify the
appropriate level of review. "The nature of this interest is the most
important variable in fixing the appropriate level of review."158 The
more important is the interest, the stricter is the standard of review
and the greater is the state's burden to justify its legislation.1 59 The
standards of review range from the equivalent of the federal rational
relationship test to the equivalent of the federal strict scrutiny test.'
60
Second, the court must ascertain the purposes served by the law.
161
"Depending on the level of review determined [under the first part of
the framework], the state may be required to show only that its objec-
tives were legitimate, at the low end of the continuum, or, at the high
end of the scale, that the legislation was motivated by a compelling
state interest."1 62 Finally, the court must examine the fit between the
means chosen by the legislature and the purposes of the law. The
higher is the level of review, the closer must be the fit.'
63
GBMI defendants in Alaska conceivably could develop three
equal protection arguments. First, those who are found GBMI under
the present definition could claim that it is irrational to classify them
differently from those who were found insane under the prior law.
Second, those adjudged GBMI of an offense could claim that to class-
ify them differently from those simply found guilty of the same offense
is irrational. Third, those found GBMI could claim that the defini-
tions of mental illness and insanity are indistinguishable and that at-
tempts to distinguish GBMI prisoners from those found NGRI are
irrational. 164 These arguments will first be analyzed under the federal
Constitution. A discussion of how a challenge under the Alaska Con-
stitution might alter the analysis follows.
When Alaska revised its insanity laws and adopted the GBMI






163. Id. at 269-70.
164. In most states, a defendant has to raise the insanity defense before he can be
found GBMI. This fact raises another equal protection argument, namely, that those
who plead insanity should not be treated differently from those who do not plead
insanity. See People v. Jackson, 80 Mich. App. 244, 263 N.W.2d 44 (1977). Subject-
ing the former group, but not the latter, to the possibility of a GBMI conviction might
be a violation of the equal protection clause. Since in Alaska, however, a defendant
can be found GBMI without raising the insanity defense, see supra notes 50-5 1, this
argument is not applicable.
165. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010-.030 (1984).
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mental illness for purposes of the GBMI verdict.166 The constitution-
ality of this change was challenged in Hart. 167 In Hart, the defendant
contended that he would have been found insane under the old law
and that a verdict of guilty under the current law therefore violated
equal protection. The court did not reach the merits of Hart's argu-
ment because it found that Hart would not have qualified as being
insane under the old law. 168 The court, however, acknowledged that
the relevant equal protection question is whether the state's differenti-
ating between defendants with the same level of mental illness ration-
ally relates to a legitimate government purpose.169 The court did not
mention what the standard might be under the Alaska Constitution.
The Hart court acknowledged that defining the point at which a
person's mental condition justifies exculpation from criminal acts is a
job reserved for the legislature. 170 Thus, defining legal insanity is a
legitimate legislative responsibility. Any time the legislature enacts
new criminal legislation or revises a law, people who previously would
have been found innocent might now be adjudged guilty under the
same facts. As long as the law is constitutional and is not applied in
an ex post facto manner, changing the law rationally relates to the
legitimate lawmaking function of the legislature.
Another conceivable equal protection argument is that the state's
distinguishing between defendants found GBMI and those found
guilty of the same offense violates the equal protection clause. At first
glance, this claim appears to be especially meritorious in Alaska, the
only state where the general parole provisions do not apply to GBMI
offenders. 171 The equal protection clause, however, does not demand
identical treatment, but only that any differentiation between GBMI
166. Until 1982, the statutory definition of insanity in Alaska was the Model Penal
Code's "substantial capacity" test. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.083 (1980) (repealed
1982), quoted supra at note 4. This test is now the definition of mental illness required
for a finding of GBMI. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030(a) (1984).
167. 704 P.2d 651.
168. The court in Hart acknowledged that there were three classes of persons ex-
empt from criminal responsibility under Alaska's previous insanity defense:
1. those unable as a result of mental disease or defect to appreciate the
nature and quality of their conduct;
2. those unable as a result of mental disease or defect to appreciate that
their acts were wrong; and
3. those irresistably compelled to commit the acts.
Under the new insanity defense, only those in the first category are expressly ex-
empted. The Hart court noted that "theoretically" those in the other two classes
could contend that their constitutional rights had been violated. Id. at 658.
169. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
170. Hart, 702 P.2d at 659.
171. See Slobogin, supra note 92, at 511 n.79.
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and ordinary prisoners bear some relevance to a legitimate state pur-
pose.' 72 The GBMI classification is designed to punish criminals and
to assure that those criminals whose behavior is caused by a level of
mental illness insufficient to constitute an excuse receive treatment. 73
Crime prevention is a legitimate state purpose. Denying parole or fur-
lough to inmates whose mental illness makes them dangerous to soci-
ety is rationally related to this purpose. 174 GBMI inmates become
eligible for these privileges once they are no longer "dangerous to the
public peace or safety."' 75 The classification continues, therefore, only
as long as is necessary to achieve the stated purpose. Thus, restricting
the release of GBMI inmates does not violate equal protection.
Finally, defendants in Alaska could argue that distinguishing be-
tween the insane and the mentally ill violates equal protection because
the definitions of insanity and mental illness are based on similar be-
havioral characteristics. This argument, though not yet addressed in
Alaska, has failed in other courts. 76 Although no bright line exists
between legal insanity and the types of mental illness that do not ex-
cuse criminal conduct, the general consensus is that only some men-
tally ill people are eligible for acquittal. 77 Although application of the
definition of legal insanity may prove difficult, the state need not ex-
cuse every mentally ill criminal. Acquitting only those with the most
severe mental illnesses, while providing treatment to jailed prisoners
who suffer from less severe illnesses, is rationally related to the goal of
ensuring treatment for those whose criminal conduct is inexcusable.
Due to the absence of controlling precedent, it is impossible to
predict exactly what level of scrutiny Alaska courts would apply when
reviewing the constitutionality of the GBMI verdict under the equal
protection clause of the Alaska Constitution. The determining factor
will be the weight accorded the impaired interest. 178 The asserted in-
dividual interest-the right of a prisoner who has committed a crime
under the influence of mental illness to be free from mandatory treat-
ment intended to help him and to be free from restrictions on release
applicable only while he remains dangerous-appears to be relatively
172. See Note, supra note 14, at 813.
173. See Note, supra note 15, at 548.
174. See People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 663-64, 288 N.W.2d 909, 919 (1980)
(finding that stricter probationary terms for GBMI inmates are rationally related to
government's purpose of deterring future crimes by GBMI offenders).
175. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., People v. Soma, 88 Mich. App. 351, 360, 276 N.W.2d 892, 896
(1979). One commentator has pointed out that distinguishing between "mental ill-
ness" and "insanity" will be more difficult in states using the broad Model Penal Code
test of insanity and substantially easier where the test is a stricter one, as in Alaska.
See Note, supra note 15, at 550-51 n.254.
177. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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weak. The level of review, therefore, is likely to approximate the fed-
eral rational relationship standard.179
Under equal protection analysis in Alaska, the prisoner's interest
will be balanced against a very important state interest-preventing
repeated criminal conduct by mentally ill offenders.18 0 The fit between
the means and the ends is also very close.181 Only a prisoner found
mentally ill in a trial is subject to differentiation, and treatment contin-
ues only as long as the prisoner remains dangerous. 182 In light of the
above discussion, it seems highly unlikely that a successful equal pro-
tection challenge to the GBMI statute can be made under the Alaska
Constitution.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
While Alaska's insanity laws are neither patently unfair nor un-
constitutional, the following changes would help to clarify the legal
status of mentally ill offenders and to assure that the law provides
GBMI prisoners with all necessary treatment. First, Alaska must im-
prove the quality and availability of mental health care.183 Second,
defendants should have adequate notice of who will be deemed NGRI
and who will be found GBMI. To provide this notice, the Alaska
Supreme Court's opinion in Patterson should resolve the conflict be-
tween the Alaska legislature' 8 4 and the court of appeals'8 regarding
the scope of the insanity defense. Furthermore, the statute should
provide for hearings and examinations to determine and document
that officials are properly administering treatment to prisoners. The
public then would be more likely to perceive the GBMI verdict as fair
and effective.
The highest priority for those concerned about the treatment of
mentally ill defendants in Alaska should be to reform the state's
mental health care system. Adequate psychiatric treatment at an ear-
lier stage of illness might reduce the number of crimes committed by
mentally ill offenders. Quibbling over the final disposition of mentally
ill defendants is senseless if none of the alternatives will afford the
treatment necessary to cure these defendants and to prevent future
crimes. Only after adequate mental health care is available in Alaska
can GBMI prisoners receive the treatment they require.
179. See id.
180. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
184. See 1982 ALASKA HOUSE JOURNAL supp. 63, at 5-6 (June 1, 1982).
185. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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Another pressing problem with the present insanity defense is
that defendants lack notice of who will be considered NGRI.
Although the Alaska legislature apparently intended a narrow defini-
tion of the defense, 186 the court of appeals has interpreted the statute
broadly. 187 The state's appeal of Patterson provides an opportunity for
the supreme court to resolve this conflict and to determine the scope of
the statute. Although defendants and practitioners presently are un-
certain about the wisdom of pleading insanity, interpretation by the
court should resolve the controversy and provide fair notice of the
definition of legal insanity in Alaska.
Finally, with respect to the controversial GBMI verdict, more
stringent procedural safeguards would make the GBMI verdict fairer
in the eyes of mentally ill defendants. A mandatory psychratric evalu-
ation before treatment or a postconviction judicial hearing to deter-
mine the prisoner's mental state would alleviate concerns that
competent prisoners are being treated unnecessarily. 188 These safe-
guards would also check some of the Department of Corrections' dis-
cretion to decide which GBMI prisoners must receive treatment. 189
Periodic hearings and examinations to ensure that GBMI inmates are
being treated adequately also would allow prisoners or interested par-
ties to enforce the prisoners' right to treatment. 190 These steps admit-
tedly will increase the costs of a program that already suffers from
insufficient funding. 191 To allocate money to the GBMI program effi-
ciently, the legislature must balance the need for these procedural safe-
guards with the added expense.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1982 revision of the Alaska insanity defense and the addition
of the GBMI verdict fell within the authority of the legislature. The
GBMI statute legitimately achieves stricter social control over men-
tally ill offenders by acquitting only the most severely afflicted defend-
ants and by mandating treatment for the less severely afflicted. For
several reasons, the statute needs more stringent procedural safe-
guards. Efforts should also be made to improve Alaska's treatment of
mentally ill offenders. These efforts should be directed at enhancing
186. See 1982 ALASKA HOUSE JOURNAL supp. 63, at 5-6 (June 1, 1982).
187. See Patterson v. State, 708 P.2d 712, 717 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
188. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 111.
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the quality and increasing the availability of mental health care in the
state.
Suzan E. DeBusk
